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INTRODUCTION
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction over enumerated cases and controversies. Of course, merely affixing the label "case" or "controversy" to a dispute does not give federal courts jurisdiction. Rather, certain elements of a "case" or "controversy" serve to "identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process" as opposed to those disputes that cannot be resolved by federal courts because they do not come within the ambit of Article III. 1 These elements derive from structural, separation of powers considerations, as they demarcate "fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our system of government." 2 One facet of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement is standing, without which a party is not "entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute." 3 The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements." 4 First, the party asserting the existing case or controversy "must have suffered an injury in fact," that is, "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." 5 Second, "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . ." 6 Third, "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." 7 These serve to ensure that a plaintiff has "'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." 9. Id. at 499. 10. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) . 11. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997 496-97 (1971) . Professor Shapiro called this proposition into question, arguing that "these suggestions of an overriding obligation . . . are far too grudging in their recognition of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction," which "has ancient and honorable roots at common law as well as in equity." David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985) . This Article does not undertake the task of defending the Cohens rule on originalist grounds or explaining its proper application in light of the traditional understanding of jurisdiction and the judicial power; instead, this Article assumes the validity of the Cohens rule on these grounds for purposes of the following analysis.
Certainly, Professor Shapiro was justified to "wonder about Chief Justice Marshall's accusation of treason" in light of "the remarkable variety of instances in which the federal courts exercise discretion in matters of jurisdiction." Id. at 570. In Wyandotte alone, for instance, immediately after citing Cohens, the Court said, "Nevertheless, although it may initially have been contemplated that this Court would always exercise its original jurisdiction when properly called upon to do so, it seems evident to us that 230 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:227 Recently, the Court has evinced some cognitive dissonance regarding these two incongruent propositions. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., for instance, a unanimous Court deemed the label prudential standing to be misleading. 18 It then "clarif[ied] the nature of the question at issue," rejecting Lexmark's argument "that we should decline to adjudicate Static Control's claim on grounds that are 'prudential,' rather than constitutional." 19 This was because that "request is in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the principle that 'a federal court's obligation to hear and decides' cases within its jurisdiction 'is virtually unflagging. '" 20 To ameliorate this tension, the Court in footnote three of Lexmark reclassified the generalized-grievances and zone-of-interests facets of prudential standing. 21 Notably, however, the Court observed that " [t] he limitations on third-party standing are harder to classify." 22 Because that case did "not present any issue of third-party standing," the Court concluded that "consideration of that doctrine's proper place in the standing firmament can await another day." That petition asks the Court to decide "[w]hether a private party with Article III standing may be barred from asserting constitutional claims for money damages against the federal Government because of the equitable doctrine of 'third-party prudential standing.'"
25
Whether or not this case proves to be the vehicle for the Court to answer this question, at some point it will need to resolve this tension once and for all. This Article explores this tension by explaining how the Court has attempted to resolve it, by discussing what the Court might do in the wake of Lexmark and in response to the certiorari petition in Starr International, and by identifying likely implications should the Court decide to abrogate the "self-imposed" changes in the American legal system and the development of American society have rendered untenable, as a practical matter, the view that this Court must stand willing to adjudicate all or most legal disputes that may arise between one State and a citizen or citizens of another, even though the dispute may be one over which this Court does have original jurisdiction." Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. at 497. See also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 818 (noting that a court may, in "exceptional" circumstances, decline jurisdiction "for reasons of judicial administration," despite citing Cohens immediately beforehand for the proposition that federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them").
18 26 In short, if prudence is an inadequate basis to decline jurisdiction, the Court needs to revisit, along with prudential standing, the doctrine of prudential ripeness, the state litigation requirement under the Takings Clause, the political question doctrine, abstention doctrines, and (by inverse implication) even the overbreadth doctrine.
I. "'PRUDENTIAL STANDING' IS A MISNOMER"
Part of the problem with the Court's prudential standing jurisprudence is that "standing" in those cases is not the same thing as "standing" in the Article III sense. 27 The tension thus stems, at the very least, from poor labeling.
28
For instance, calling the "zone of interests" test a rule of "'prudential standing' is a misnomer."
29 After all, whether "the plaintiff came within the 'zone of interests'" of a statute "has nothing to do with whether there is case or controversy under Article III."
30 Even the label "statutory standing," while arguably "an improvement over the language of 'prudential standing,'" still is misleading. 31 Whether or not a party is within the "zone of interests" "does not implicate . . . the court's statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case," 32 whereas the question of a party's Article III standing does. This test, labeled one of "standing," is actually a merits question-does the plaintiff have a judicially-cognizable claim under the law invoked? 33 To answer it, courts do not look to their jurisdictional bounds, but rather they "apply traditional principles of statutory interpretation" to determine whether the complaint states a valid cause of action with respect to the law in question. 34 If the plaintiff has a viable claim, "a court . A similar result obtains when one looks more closely at the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances. It turns out that this "prudential" rule is merely another way of identifying whether a given plaintiff has the "injury-infact" required by Article III or whether there exists a judicially-cognizable case or controversy at all. This is why, for example, the Court has held that a plaintiff lacked the requisite injury where it was simply "a grievance . . . 'suffer [ed] in some indefinite way in common with people generally.'" 36 A plaintiff who only raises a "generally available grievance about government-claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large-does not state an Article III case or controversy." 37 The prohibition of adjudication of generalized grievances "ensures that courts exercise power that is judicial in nature," which is what animates the case-orcontroversy requirement. 38 The whole "gist of the question of standing" is whether a party has "alleged . . . a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy"-without that, there simply is no justiciable "case." 39 The prudential prohibition on adjudicating generalized grievances turns out not to be prudential at all, but rather another way of framing the fundamental Article III inquiry.
In individual brings an overbreadth challenge to a law, tantamount to bringing a third party's claims, 51 the Court has still required 52 that the plaintiff have some sort of "personal stake in the controversy . . . to confer standing" to permit the plaintiff to "advance the overbreadth argument." 53 Accordingly, the Court could opt to analyze the third-party standing question as informing whether the plaintiff has an "injury in fact" with respect to the asserted claim. 54 This would make the rule not one of prudence, but rather a way of enforcing the constitutional requirements of Article III. So long as a party has a personal, "concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation," 55 the plaintiff would satisfy Article III's requirements, and the Court would have to adjudicate the claim in question, whether or not that plaintiff is "the most effective advocate of the rights at issue." 56 However, if the plaintiff lacks any "personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit," such that there is no "actual controversy" between the litigant and the defendant, then the claim is barred by Article III. 57 Alternatively, the Court could reconceive the rule as categorically different than a standing rule and avoid the potential implications of constitutionalizing the bar to third-party standing. 58 As the Court has recognized, after all, the third-party prudential standing rule is "closely related to the question whether a 52. Not consistently, to be sure. See infra Part IV.E. Nevertheless, as a general rule (even under the overbreadth doctrine, as will be discussed), a "personal stake" is necessary under Article III because, otherwise, a decision in a controversy would amount to an advisory opinion, which federal courts are not permitted to give. . See Monaghan, supra note 27, at 278 ("Few judges or commentators seem inclined to scrutinize the premises of this expanding 'third party standing': So long as he suffers an injury in fact that is both fairly traceable to the challenged statute and likely to be redressable by a favorable judgment, the litigant has standing in the constitutional sense.").
57. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 58. For example, if the Court constitutionalized the prohibition, it would seem to foreclose pure overbreadth challenges in cases where "a defendant's standing . . . does not depend upon whether his own activity is shown to be constitutionally privileged." Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815 (1975) . But see infra Part IV.E (discussing the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine). 235 
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LAST STAND FOR PRUDENTIAL STANDING?
person in the litigant's position would have a right of action on the claim." 59 As such, it sounds similar to the "zone of interests" test that the Court concluded is more properly conceived of as a merits question, not a threshold standing requirement. 60 In Lexmark, Justice Scalia seemed interested in taking the doctrine that direction, but he did not go all the way and do so.
61 Doing so would eliminate this last prong of prudential standing, rendering that category obsolete, by converting this last aspect of prudential standing into a merits question.
One thing is clear: if this third-party standing rule were a true prudential rule not tethered to Article III, then it likely cannot survive Lexmark, which undercut the idea that a court can decline jurisdiction on purely discretionary grounds. Cf. Charles Lane, Take Trump Seriously and Literally, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/take-trump-seriously-and-literally/2016/11/16/cbdcf2c8-ac25-11e6-8b45-f8e493f06fcd_story.html?utm_term=.8e28dae36913 [https://perma.cc/WSW8-Q4FM] ("If they gave Pulitzer Prizes for pithiness, journalist Salena Zito's analytical couplet on the surprise winner of Campaign 2016 would get one. The press took Republican Donald Trump 'literally, but not seriously,' she wrote, whereas Trump's supporters took him 'seriously, but not literally.'").
then it will need to acknowledge that it "would be treason to the constitution" to "decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given." 64 As such, there is no denying that the Court appears poised "to reconsider . . . third-party standing . . . sooner rather than later" 65 -especially since the Court has recently expressed a desire to "bring some discipline" to the use of jurisdictional labels. 66 Following Lexmark and its reemphasis of Cohens, either this "prudential standing" rule needs to be integrated into Article III's requirements, it needs to be reclassified, or else it must be abandoned. During the economic crisis in the last decade, the government bailed out the insurer AIG, and, in exchange, the government "received a majority stake in AIG's equity under the loan, which the Government eventually converted into common stock and sold."
68 One of AIG's largest shareholders, Starr International, then sued in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the government's actions were unlawful as they amounted to an illegal exaction and a Fifth Amendment taking. 69 The Court of Federal Claims agreed in part, concluding that the government's actions amounted to an illegal exaction, and the government appealed, asserting that Starr International lacked standing to raise these claims. 70 The Federal Circuit, in turn, agreed with the government. 71 Although it acknowledged that Starr International had "satisfied the requirements of constitutional standing derived from Article III," the court nevertheless held that Starr International was barred from pursuing its claim thanks to the "prudential" doctrine of third-party standing. 72 In a one-sentence footnote, the court addressed the implications of Lexmark, noting that the Court there "shed the 'prudential' label for certain other requirements of standing but did not expressly do so for the principle of third-party standing." 73 Starr International appealed this decision. Adding to its already formidable slate of advocates, 74 Starr International brought in former Solicitor General Paul Clement to help write the petition. The petition has only one Question Presented: "Whether a private party with Article III standing may be barred from asserting constitutional claims for money damages against the federal Government because of the equitable doctrine of 'third-party prudential standing. '" 75 In its petition, Starr International argues that, "[a]lthough the Lexmark Court did not definitively resolve how to classify third-party standing, the Court's reasoning makes plain that third-party standing cannot survive as a 'prudential' doctrine." 76 In order for "the third-party standing doctrine . . . to survive as a standing doctrine, as opposed to a merits doctrine or something else, it will need As discussed above, it is hard to see how Starr International is wrong, but, at the very least, given Lexmark, the Court needs to resolve this issue. If the Court has been looking for "another day" to come, 79 Starr International may be its chance.
IV. DOMINO EFFECTS
If the Court abrogates prudential standing on the basis that a federal court cannot decline to hear a case otherwise within its jurisdiction on discretionary or prudential grounds, ripple effects will likely emanate from that holding. Notwithstanding what some have deemed to be a "judicial resurgence" of the Cohens rule, "self-imposed limits on federal judicial power are rather common."
80 Prudential ripeness, the state-litigation requirement under the Takings Clause, aspects of the political question doctrine, and abstention are all examples of such self-imposed limits.
81 These other self-imposed rules and prudential doctrines may need to be reexamined, depending on how the Court resolves the issue of third-party prudential standing.
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A. Ripeness
One such rule is ripeness. When applying ripeness, courts essentially conclude that some cases are better left undecided than resolved prematurely. For instance, if a claim "rests upon 'contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,'" then that "claim is not ripe for adjudication," and a court may decline jurisdiction. 83 This rule is ostensibly drawn "both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction."
84 It allows federal courts to evaluate both "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision" as well as "the 81. The overbreadth doctrine is a self-imposed expansion rather than a self-imposed restriction, but it still reflects a deviation from the Cohens rule, albeit in the opposite direction from these restrictions. Nevertheless, given its relation to the third-party standing rule and the confusion surrounding the doctrine, it is discussed herein as well. See infra Part IV.E.
82. Hard as it may be to believe about pretty much any given subject within legal academia, it appears that "discussions about self-imposed limits as a topic in and of itself" are "rare." Smith Following Lexmark, that last proposition appears doubtful. In a case decided shorlty after Lexmark, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit for holding that the petitioners' claims were not justiciable because they were "not ripe for review." 87 The Court, once again unanimous, rejected the view that the Susan B. Anthony List-a pro-life advocacy group that sought to display a billboard opposing then-Congressman Steve Driehaus's reelection campaign because he "voted FOR taxpayer-funded abortion"-had not satisfied the requirements of "prudential ripeness" in seeking to challenge a state law that prohibited "false statements" "during the course of any campaign for nomination or election to public office." 88 The Court disapproved the Sixth Circuit's reliance on "prudential ripeness" to hold the claim nonjusticiable and rejected the invitation to do so: "[W]e have already concluded that petitioners have alleged a sufficient Article III injury," and "[t]o the extent respondents would have us deem petitioners' claims nonjusticiable on grounds that are prudential, rather than constitutional, that request is in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the principle that a federal court's obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging." 89 The Court, however, did not need to "resolve the continuing vitality of the prudential ripeness doctrine . . . because the 'fitness' and 'hardship' factors are easily satisfied here." 90 Nevertheless, the Court's disapproval of prudential ripeness here does not bode well for the enduring vitality of "prudential ripeness."
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There appears a simple way out of the thicket for the Court. Article III already requires that "those who seek to invoke the power of federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy" before federal courts may exercise jurisdic-85. Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep 95 Thus, it may be that "the Article III standing and ripeness issues . . . 'boil down to the same question'" in every case. 96 Whether an issue is "fit" for judicial review or whether a party might experience "hardship" from delaying judicial review, it turns out, sounds like a different way of asking whether a plaintiff has an injury that is "concrete and particularized," as well as "actual or imminent" or "certainly impending."
97 Courts and commentators have reasoned similarly. 98 Given the Court's awareness of Lexmark's implications for this rule, this seems likely to be the next doctrine ripe for reconsideration. But there are more.
B. Takings and the State-Litigation Requirement
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." 99 This clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 100 Understood initially to apply only to the federal government, 101 the Court later construed the Fourteenth Amendment's due process of law clause to require compensation if a state were to take "private property for public use" as well. 114 This is true all the more so in this context, since not only is the Williamson requirement a prudential hurdle above and beyond Article III, but it also has the effect, in a significant number of cases, of completely depriving plaintiffs of a federal forum for a cause of action arising under the Federal Constitution. 115 How is it that the Court feels it may create exceptions to the Article III jurisdiction of federal courts, but it cannot "create an exception to the full faith and credit statute . . . in order to provide a federal forum for litigants who seek to advance federal takings claims"?
116 Under the Court's jurisprudence, federal courts are free to disregard their "virtually unflagging" obligation to hear cases and controversies properly before them, but these same federal courts "are not free to disregard" a congressional statute in the name of trying "to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can have their day in federal court."
117 No doubt, then, that this state-litigation requirement "has created some real anomalies"-anomalies significant enough that four justices in San Remo Hotel wanted to "revisit[] the issue" then.
118 If the Court revisits other "prudential hurdles" it has raised, then this state-litigation rule, not compelled by "either constitutional or prudential principles," 119 will need to be reconsidered as well. 
C. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is, in part, a judicially self-imposed rule not to hear cases when they raise certain issues involving other branches of government. The canonical formulation of the doctrine comes from Baker v. Carr:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
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Since then, courts and jurists have emphasized the importance of the prudential aspects of the doctrine. Justice Powell, concurring in Goldwater v. Carter, recognized that "the political-question doctrine rests in part on prudential concerns calling for mutual respect among the three branches of Government." 122 The courts of appeals have echoed this refrain. 123 The trouble is, if the Court has an obligation to hear an Article III case or controversy before it, then it cannot decline to adjudicate the case because it might entangle the Court in political turmoil, no matter what prudence might suggest to the contrary.
124 It is no wonder, then, that courts and commentators alike "have found" the doctrine "an impenetrable thicket." In 2012, the Court in Zivotofsky hinted at harmonizing these propositions by describing the doctrine as "a narrow exception" to the rule that "the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those it 'would gladly avoid. '" 126 Though not an explicit repudiation of the prudential prongs of the political question doctrine, some commentators have fairly read this pronouncement to be as much.
127 A clear-cut decision that ends prudential standing for being contrary to the Cohens rule would further reinforce this view.
If this happens, it will likely force the prudential aspects of Baker to fall unequivocally. After all, the doctrine is "essentially a function of the separation of powers," 128 much like Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, 129 and the comparable concerns animating these doctrines suggest that similar analyses should apply to them. 130 Furthermore, the Court has recognized that the political question doctrine, like standing, derives from Article III's case-orcontroversy requirement. 131 Abandoning the prudential aspects of the political question doctrine follows logically from abandoning prudential components of standing generally.
At 136 Finally, whatever one thinks about "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question,"
137 the existence of "multifarious pronouncements" has not deterred federal courts from entering the fray and adding to the mix. 134. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Some might contend that this is a logical application of the Constitution's structure or is implicit in the concept of "judicial power." See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 206 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("When such unusual cases arise, abstention accommodates considerations inherent in the separation of powers and the limitations envisioned by Article III, which conferred authority to federal courts against a common-law backdrop that recognized the propriety of abstention in exceptional cases."); cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (articulating a restrained view of judicial power).
However, the text explicitly commits the judicial power to the Court, and that power extends to all cases and controversies without providing an "out" for particularly thorny cases. The behavior of the Supreme Court confirms as much. After all, one is hard-pressed to imagine cases fraught with more political complications than ones that the Court has taken up involving national healthcare regimes, enemy combatants in wartime, presidential elections, political gerrymandering, abortion, endemic racial segregation, national economic recovery programs, and slavery. See Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus alongside the recognition that "federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred."
139
Trying to harmonize these prudential considerations with the judiciary's duty to exercise its jurisdiction, some have stated that these considerations apply as a "narrow exception" and only when a court "has been asked to conclusively resolve a question that is 'wholly and indivisibly' committed by the Constitution to a political branch of government," but otherwise "a federal court must not abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred."
140 Others have reasoned that, "[a]lthough prudential considerations may inform a court's justiciability analysis, the political question doctrine is essentially a constitutional limitation on the courts." courts lacked authority to decide the case because it presented a political question." 143 The D.C. Circuit agreed. The Supreme Court, however, did not. Reciting the standard for what constitutes a political question, the Court emphasized that there must be "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it," and it found neither to be present in this controversy. 144 Noticeably, the Court did not mention the other, prudential types of political questions possible under Baker. Justice Sotomayor did in her concurrence, 145 joined in part by Justice Breyer who also mentioned these factors in his lone dissent. 146 While even those defending the prudential aspects of Baker acknowledged that "it will be the rare case in which [those] factors alone render a case nonjusticiable,"
147 Justice Breyer felt that Zivotofsky was such a case in that there was "serious risk that intervention will bring about 'embarrassment,' show lack of 'respect' for the other branches, and potentially disrupt sound foreign policy decisionmaking." 148 The fact that Justice Breyer was unable to persuade any of his colleagues to find a political question based on the prudential grounds he highlights, coupled with the majority's omission of those factors in its recitation of what constitutes a political question, is telling.
Lest Zivotofsky be considered a one-off, a similar result obtained earlier in Nixon v. United States. 149 In Nixon, the Court held that a challenge to the Senate's impeachment procedures by a former federal judge was nonjusticiable. 150 Like in Zivotofsky, so too in Nixon, the majority identified a political question as one in which "there is 'a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it,'" without 143. Id. at 191. 144. Id. at 195 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)). 145. Id. at 204-08 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing Baker's prudential factors and noting that "my understanding of the political question doctrine might require a court to engage in further analysis beyond that relied upon by the Court").
146. Id. at 212 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Alito also concurred, acknowledging that "[u]nder our case law, determining the constitutionality of an Act of Congress may present a political question," but he agreed with the majority that this case did "not constitute a political question that the Judiciary is unable to decide." Id. at 211-12 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 207 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); accord id. at 213 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Indeed, it is the "rare" case. Judge Edwards identified only two cases in which the Court dismissed the matter for "presenting nonjusticiable political questions." Zivotofksy v. Sec'y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Edwards, J., concurring). Tellingly, in both of those cases, the Court found an explicit textual commitment of an issue to other branches of the federal government. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993) (finding "the textual commitment argument" dispositive, though going on to consider points "[i]n addition to" this one); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("[T]he nature of the questions to be resolved on remand are subjects committed expressly to the political branches of government.").
148. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 220 (Breyer, J., dissenting To ease the observable strain here, some commentators have tried to justify these abstention doctrines by way of the text, 180 arguing that "the Supreme Court has crafted the abstention doctrines, or at least some of them, as a continuing exercise in constitutional law, and not merely as prudential limits upon the federal judicial power." 181 The Tenth Amendment may provide a viable basis for certain abstention principles. 182 Furthermore, some forms of abstention could possibly be conceptualized in ways that might insulate it from a Cohens-based critique-for example, the Court maintained that Pullman abstention "does not . . . involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise." 183 Nevertheless, if "federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred," then this would be true, one would think, even if "comity," "equity," or discretion suggest otherwise. 184 Much like the dissent in Colorado River, then, one may be befuddled that the Court could simultaneously recognize federal courts' "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them," while nevertheless endorsing a rule allowing them to avoid hearing a case or controversy on essentially discretionary or prudential grounds. 185 If the Court sees fit to reconsider how prudential
